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HOME SWEET HOME: HOW NEW YORK COURTS HAVE
DEALT WITH DAIMLER’S “AT HOME” REQUIREMENT FOR
GENERAL JURISDICTION
Burton N. Lipshie*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Daimler AG v. Bauman,1 almost certainly its most important
jurisdiction decision in some seventy years, an eight-Justice majority
of the Supreme Court essentially rewrote the law of general
jurisdiction.2 The result is that a corporation will, with narrow
exceptions, only be subject to general jurisdiction in the states in
which it is either incorporated or maintains its principal place of
business; in the Court’s language, a state in which the corporation is
“at home.”3 The once familiar standard for general jurisdiction—
corporate “presence” in a state in which it “does business” both
“continuously and systematically”—has been abrogated, except,
possibly, in “exceptional” cases.4 Additionally, the Court announced
that the “paradigm” place where an individual is “at home” is where
that individual is domiciled.5
The Court issued a sweeping opinion on the constitutional limits of
presence jurisdiction and, in the process, swept away decades of New
York CPLR 301 jurisprudence.6 First, the Court rejected the
argument, accepted and followed by many Circuits, that when a local

* Managing Attorney of Litigation at Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, LLP, Adjunct Professor of
Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, Member, Advisory Committee
on Civil Practice to the Chief Administrative Judge of the State of New York.
1 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
2 Id. at 122.
3 Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924
(2011)).
4 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 132, 138 nn.18–19.
5 Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).
6 See Jay C. Carlisle, Paterno v. Laser Spine Institute: Did the New York Court of Appeals’
Misapplication of Unjustified Policy Fears Lead to a Miscarriage of Justice and the Creation of
Inadequate Precedent for the Proper Use of Empire State’s Long Arm-Statute?, 79 ALB. L. REV.
1371, 1374 (2016) (“It seems clear that the broad general jurisdiction of CPLR 301 permitted
under Tauza and its progeny is no longer constitutionally permitted in New York [following
Daimler].”).
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agent performs services for the foreign principal that are so
important that “if it did not have a representative to perform them,
the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform
substantially similar services,” the presence of the agent in the state
makes the principal present in that state.7 That test, said the Court,
“stacks the deck,” because “it will always yield a pro-jurisdiction
answer.”8
Instead, the Court relied heavily on—and expanded upon—its
decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, saying
that
Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations
with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose
jurisdiction there. “For an individual, the paradigm forum for
the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile;
for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the
corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”9
And, for a corporation, “the place of incorporation and principal
place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’”10
The Court recognized that “Goodyear did not hold that a corporation
may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed
those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”11 The Court went on to
state, “[p]laintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases
Goodyear identified, and approve the exercise of general jurisdiction
in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business.’ That formulation, we
hold, is unacceptably grasping.”12
This marks a dramatic change in the law. In New York, the
formulation proposed by the Daimler plaintiffs had been the law
since then-Judge Cardozo’s 1917 opinion in Tauza v. Susquehanna

7 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134, 135, 136. This principle was set forth by the Second Circuit in
Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967), which has been cited
and followed numerous times by the courts of New York State. See Airtran N.Y., LLC v.
Midwest Air Group, Inc., 844 N.Y.S.2d 233, 241 (App. Div. 2007); see, e.g., Delagi v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895, 898 (N.Y. 1972); Pacamor Bearings, Inc. v. Molon Motors
& Coil, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d 856, 857 (App. Div. 1984).
8 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 135–36.
9 Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924) (emphasis added).
10 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924) (alterations in original).
11 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.
12 Id. at 137–38 (internal citations omitted).
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Coal Company.13 The majority opinion cites Tauza, and proclaims
that it was “decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer [v. Neff]’s
territorial thinking, [and] should not attract heavy reliance today.”14
The new standard articulated by the Court is that the inquiry “is not
whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in
some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and
systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.’”15 The Court acknowledged
the possibility that in an exceptional case, a corporation’s
operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation
at home in that State. But this case presents no occasion to
explore that question, because Daimler’s activities in
California plainly do not approach that level. It is one thing
to hold a corporation answerable for operations in the forum
State, quite another to expose it to suit on claims having no
connection whatever to the forum State.16
Finally, and importantly, the Court noted that
[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not “focu[s] solely on
the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” General
jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, “at home” would
be synonymous with “doing business” tests framed before
specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States. Nothing in
International Shoe [Co. v. Washington] and its progeny
suggests that “a particular quantum of local activity” should
give a State authority over a “far larger quantum of . . .
13 Compare id. (proposing that the Court should adopt a “continuous and systematic” view
of general jurisdiction), with Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917–18 (N.Y. 1917)
(“All that is requisite is that enough be done [by the corporation] to enable us to say that the
corporation is here.”).
14 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 n.18 (internal citations omitted) (discussing Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1878)).
15 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
16 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (internal citations omitted).
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activity” having no connection to any in-state activity.17
In this Article, we will first place the Daimler decision in its
context, both historical and technological, in an attempt to
understand the flow of Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence,
and how Daimler fits into that jurisprudence. Then, we will explore
the issues in New York law that Daimler left open, and which, more
than five years after it was decided, remain open, and, indeed, often
confused.
II. PUTTING DAIMLER IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
To understand the sea-change that Daimler appears to have
created, it may be useful to put it in its historical context, and follow
the train of Supreme Court jurisdiction jurisprudence, to see how we
got here, and where “here” in fact is.
If we could travel back to 1878, we would see an obviously very
different United States. To put it in a timeline perspective, in 1878
the country was closer in time to the last bloody years of the Civil
War than we, in 2019, are to the atrocities of September 11, 2001.18
How clear the memory, and how raw the wounds, still were. The
awful struggle of the Civil War was in large part a battle about
“states’ rights”—the individual states’ power to impose slavery, and,
importantly, to reach beyond their borders to require non-slave states
to respect that hideous institution when masters and slaves traveled
to those non-slave states.19 And, at the most basic level, the war was
about their right to leave the union.20 There are those who say the
Civil War was, in significant part, fought over a point of grammar.21
Is it “the United States is . . .” or “the United States are . . .”?22 The
national government had won the dreadful war, but the aftermath—
17 Id. at 139 n.20 (discussing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (internal
citations omitted).
18 1878 was only thirteen years after the end of the American Civil War in 1865, while it has
been almost eighteen years since the attacks on 9/11. See Peter L. Bergen, September 11
Attacks, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks (last visited
Apr. 7, 2019); James McPherson, A Brief Overview of the American Civil War, AM. BATTLEFIELD
TR., https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/brief-overview-american-civil-war (last visited
Apr. 7, 2019).
19 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 431 (1857); McPherson, supra note 18.
20 See 10 Facts: What Everyone Should Know About the Civil War, AM. BATTLEFIELD TR.,
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/10-facts-what-everyone-should-know-about-civilwar (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
21 See Life in These, Uh, This United States, U. PA.: LANGUAGE LOG, http://itre.cis.upenn.edu
/myl/languagelog/archives/002663.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
22 Id.
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Reconstruction—was, to say the very least, ugly.23 It saw the great
hopes of reunification of the nation under Thomas Jefferson’s soaring
promise that “all men are created equal”24 devolve into sectionalism
and violence.25 And in 1878, with Reconstruction still unfolding, no
one in federal authority, including the Supreme Court, was eager to
extend the powers of individual states to reach beyond their borders
to impose their will.26
The nature of society, in general, was also quite different in 1878.
Travel, for example, was, to a large extent, not much easier than it
had been in 1778.27 It would be another thirty years before the first
Fords would roll off the assembly line.28 Railroads were available,
but not used much for passenger travel except by the wealthy.29
Generally, travel was still mostly by horse.30 It was arduous and
time-consuming to get anywhere beyond one’s local area.31 Business
in 1878 was still mostly local.32 There were a few large corporations,
but most business was still small.33 Alexander Graham Bell had
23 See 10 Facts: What Everyone Should Know About the Civil War, supra note 20; Eric Foner,
Civil War and Reconstruction, 1861-1877, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HIST., https://www.gilde
rlehrman.org/history-now/civil-war-and-reconstruction-1861-1877 (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
24 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
25 See Foner, supra note 23.
26 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732–33 (1878) (limiting a state’s ability to obtain
jurisdiction over out of state defendants); e.g. Jeffery M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby County’s
Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 206, 246 (2016) (“Together, the
Reconstruction Amendments limited state power and significantly enhanced the authority of
the federal government.”).
27 Contra Historical Background on Traveling in the Early 19th Century, TEACH US HIST.,
http://www.teachushistory.org/detocqueville-visit-united-states/articles/historicalbackground-traveling-early-19th-century (last visited Mar. 16, 2019) (“The years between 1790
and 1840 saw a true revolution in transportation even before the coming of the railroad.”).
28 See 1908: Ford Motor Company Unveils the Model T, HIST., https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/ford-motor-company-unveils-the-model-t (last updated Feb. 25, 2019).
29 Compare Jimmy Stamp, Traveling in Style and Comfort: The Pullman Sleeping Car,
SMITHSONIAN (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/traveling-styleand-comfort-pullman-sleeping-car-180949300/ (“[C]ivilized travel came with a slightly steeper
price tag[,] [b]ut in the 19th Century, and even into the 20th, long-distance train travel was
almost exclusively enjoyed by the wealthy and growing middle class.”), with Historical
Background on Traveling in the Early 19th Century, supra note 27 (“[By 1960] the railroad,
growing ever faster, more powerful and more efficient, would become America’s dominant mode
of transportation east of Mississippi, sweeping away stage lines and even making some canals
obsolete.”).
30 See Joel A. Tarr & Clay McShane, The Horse as an Urban Technology, 15 J. URB. TECH.
5, 6 (2008).
31 See, e.g., Historical Background on Traveling in the Early 19th Century, supra note 27;
Oregon Trail, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/oregon-trail (last
updated Aug. 21, 2018).
32 See History of American Small Business, SQUARE UP, https://squareup.com/townsquare/hi
story-of-american-small-business (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
33 See America’s Gilded Age: Robber Barons and Captains of Industry, MARYVILLE U.,
https://online.maryville.edu/business-degrees/americas-gilded-age/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2019);

DAIMLER’S “AT HOME” REQUIREMENT

1188

4/16/2019 10:04 AM

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 82.4

invented the telephone only two years earlier, and it would be some
time before it was generally available.34
In that political and cultural context, it is not at all surprising that,
faced with the question of the power of a state court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Supreme Court would
hold that a state could exercise that power only over any one, or
anything, found within the borders of the state, with no state
authority to reach beyond its borders to exercise that power and force
non-residents to come to the state to mount a defense to a lawsuit.35
And so it did, in Pennoyer v. Neff.36
While it was easy to determine whether an individual was within
a particular state when, by service of process, the state sought to
exercise jurisdiction over that individual, the question, over the
succeeding years, became just what does it mean for a corporation to
be “found” within a state.37 Courts, most famously the New York
Court of Appeals in then Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Corp., began to hold that if a corporation was
“present” in the state, by regularly and continuously doing business
there, the artificial detail of where it happened to be incorporated or
had its main office, did not prevent it from being “found” within the
state, and subject to that state’s general jurisdiction.38 A court would
look at such things as the existence of an office, of employees, of bank
accounts.39 All of these were indicia of “presence.”40
If we could fast-forward from 1878 to 1945, we would find
significant changes in the political and cultural landscape of the
United States in those almost seventy years. The country was very
different politically. It had just fought and won the “good war”
against fascist tyranny.41 We were a united country in many
respects, without the struggles of the Civil War era (of course, “states’
rights,” in a related but different context, would later become another
roiling issue).42 So, limiting the power of individual states was not
History of American Small Business, supra note 32.
34 See 1870s-1940s: Telephone, IMAGINING THE INTERNET, http://www.elon.edu/e-web/predict
ions/150/1870.xhtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
35 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 735; see, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
918 (2011).
38 See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917–18 (N.Y. 1917).
39 See id. at 916–17.
40 Id. at 918.
41 Mark A. Stoler, The Second World War in U.S. History and Memory, 25 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
383, 386 (2001).
42 See id. at 385.
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on the nation’s political agenda.43 Travel was also very different from
what it had been in 1878. Not only were railroads and automobiles
ubiquitous, but commercial air flights were becoming more
common.44 The country was getting smaller, and easier to navigate.45
The world of business was also very different. The nationwide
corporation was no longer a rarity.46 Corporations, wherever their
home bases might be, could reach their tentacles throughout the
country, by physical travel or by telephone, affecting commerce and
committing torts, everywhere.47
In that very different context, the Supreme Court, faced with a case
in which an out-of-state corporation sent its salesmen into a state and
sold its product there, without paying the taxes that a local business
would, could reasonably find that, regardless of where the
corporation was physically located, when it conducted activities in a
state, and the cause of action arose out of those activities, the state’s
“long arm” could reach out and exercise its jurisdiction over that
corporation.48 And so it did, in International Shoe v. Washington.49
In the wake of International Shoe, states began enacting their own
versions of long-arm jurisdiction.50 One of the more ground-breaking
was in New York, with the enactment, in the early 1960s, of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules.51 In CPLR 302, New York adopted a “single
act” statute.52 The defendant need not have extensive activity in New
York, so long as the cause of action arose from—was somehow
connected to—even one New York act, whether a transaction of
business, or the commission of a tort.53 New York even extended
jurisdiction to a tortfeasor who committed the tort outside of the
state, so long as it caused injury in the state, and the defendant either
had other significant contacts with the state, or had reason to believe

Id. at 386, 387, 390.
See Tim Lambert, A Brief History of Transport, LOCAL HISTORIES (last revised 2018),
http://www.localhistories.org/transport.html; The Heyday of Propeller Airliners, 1941-1958:
The Era of Mass Air Travel Begins, SMITHSONIAN: NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, https://airandsp
ace.si.edu/exhibitions/america-by-air/online/heyday/heyday11.cfm (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
45 See Richard F. Weingroff, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Creating the Interstate
System, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov
/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su10.cfm.
46 See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963).
47 See id.
48 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311, 313–14, 322 (1945).
49 See id.
50 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2018); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-208 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (2018).
51 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (McKinney 2019).
52 See id. § 302.
53 See id.
43
44
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its act would have consequences here and was large enough to garner
significant revenue from interstate or international (but not
necessarily New York) commerce.54 Other states enacted similar farreaching long-arm statutes.55 Thus, corporations and individuals
were subject to being compelled to litigate in a foreign state either
because of some sort of “presence” there, or because the cause of
action arose from some conduct committed or aimed at that state.56
Once again, let us leap forward in time, from 1945 to 2014. Another
almost seventy-year span. It goes without saying that the world of
2014 was completely different. Coast-to-coast flights that involved
various refueling stops in 1945, and took more than a day, now took
just a few hours.57 And even when we were not face-to-face, we were
in constant communication with each other via all of the technology
that seemed like science fiction in 1945.58 Anything that happened
anywhere in the country, indeed, anywhere in the world, was at our
fingertips within moments. Corporations that once strained to do
business in various parts of the country at once, were now global.59
Gigantic corporations had proliferated.60 They had offices, and did
regular and continuous business, almost everywhere in the country,
and throughout the world.61 And that dramatic change in the
business and technological context is a large part of what drove the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Daimler.
The Court considered the significant expansion of long-arm
jurisdiction since its International Shoe decision created the concept,
and saw that it was good.62 It is fair to hale a corporation into a forum
state when the cause of action arises out of conduct committed in, or
directed to, that state.63 But, in light of that expansion, the Court
See id.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-1-124 (West 2017); e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (2008);
FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2016).
56 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
57 See Marc Llewellyn, What Flying Was Like in the 1950s and 1960s Compared to Now,
HERALD SUN (Apr. 9, 2017), https://www.heraldsun.com.au/travel/news/what-flying-was-likein-the-1950s-and-1960s-compared-to-now/news-story/690b0f6f9b16b27ab384e146ca854882.
58 See Hayley Eastman, Communication Changes with Technology, Social Media, DAILY
UNIVERSE (July 7, 2013), https://universe.byu.edu/2013/07/07/1communication-changes-withtechnology-social-media/.
59 See Parag Khanna, The New World Order Is Ruled by Global Corporations and
Megacities—Not Countries, FAST CO. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.fastcompany.com/3059005/th
e-new-world-order-is-ruled-by-global-corporations-and-megacities-not-countries.
60 See George Serafeim, The Role of the Corporation in Society: An Alternative View and
Opportunities for Future Research 6 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-110, 2014).
61 See How Did the Corporation Become Global?, YALE INSIGHTS (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-did-the-corporation-become-global.
62 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 128 (2014).
63 See id. at 126–27.
54
55
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concluded that the expansion of general jurisdiction—jurisdiction
based on mere “presence” without the need of a connection between
the cause of action and conduct in the forum—had gone too far.64 It
is in that context that the Court rejected Tauza as a relic of the
Pennoyer era—the era of small business, no telephones, little longdistance travel, and no concept of long-arm jurisdiction.
Because global corporations—which are more and more
commonplace—are “present” wherever they do business, the Tauza
standard would not, the Court concluded, be consonant with due
process today.65 For it would make such a corporation subject to
general jurisdiction anywhere a plaintiff chose to sue, regardless how
or where the cause of action arose.66 And, to determine whether a
foreign corporation’s contacts with the forum are so significant as to
qualify as an “exceptional” case, it is not enough to look at how much
business, in an absolute sense, the corporation does in the forum—
for that would simply apply the old “presence” test.67 The Court must
look at how much of the corporation’s global business is done in the
forum.68 For, as quoted above, “[a] corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”69
Thus, the concept of limiting general jurisdiction to where a
corporation—or, indeed, an individual—is “at home,” while a major
shift from the law that came before it, fits within the political,
cultural and technological times in which the Court faced the issue.
Daimler, like Pennoyer and International Shoe before it, is to a large
extent a product of its times, and based on what the Supreme Court
sees as “fair” under current circumstances.
III. HOW DAIMLER UNSETTLES PREVIOUSLY SETTLED NEW YORK
LAW
A. Pre-Daimler Law
In the pre-Daimler universe, New York law was reasonably wellsettled as to the circumstances under which the courts could exercise
general jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to CPLR 301.70 For

See id. at 137–38.
See id. at 142 (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
66 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 132.
67 See id. at 138–39.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 139 n.20.
70 Article III of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules: Jurisdiction, Service and
Appearance, 37 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 285, 288, 290 (1963).
64
65
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an individual, residence in New York was sufficient, even if the
defendant was not a New York domiciliary.71 The First and Second
Departments disagreed as to whether a non-resident individual could
be subject to general jurisdiction in New York by virtue of regular
and continuous business activities in the state.72 It was also settled
law that a non-resident of the state who was physically served with
process while within the state, so-called “tagging jurisdiction,” was
subject to general jurisdiction.73 So long as the defendant was not
lured into the state for the purpose of being served, and was not in
the state for the sole purpose of voluntarily testifying in a proceeding,
tagging was a sufficient basis for general jurisdiction in the state no
matter where and how the cause of action accrued.74
Tagging jurisdiction was also the subject of a due process inquiry
by the Supreme Court. The Court had previously held, in Shaffer v.
Heitner,75 that minimum contacts with a state was a constitutional
requirement for the exercise of any form of jurisdiction—whether in
personam or quasi-in rem.76 In the wake of Shaffer, it was generally
believed, among the procedure law commentariat, that the Court
would eventually take a tagging jurisdiction case and declare that
general jurisdiction based solely upon the defendant being served
with process during a perhaps fortuitous and brief presence in the
state did not qualify as sufficient contacts to provide due process.77
The Court did take such a case, Burnham v. Superior Court, and
unanimously held that tagging jurisdiction was, in fact, consonant
71 See Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 460 (N.Y. 1968) (“Residence itself may provide
a foundation for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant by means of
substituted service.”) (citing Fishman v. Sanders, 206 N.E.2d 326, 329 (N.Y. 1965)); Spirgel v.
Henry H. Ackerman & Co., 633 N.Y.S.2d 144, 145 (App. Div. 1995).
72 Compare Nilsa B. v. Clyde Blackwell H., 445 N.Y.S.2d 579, 587 (App. Div. 1981) (“The
legislature has authorized jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who transacts business in the
State where the cause of action arises out of the transaction of that business, but it has gone
no further.”) (internal citation omitted), with ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Lennon, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781,
784 (App. Div. 1976) (“[First Department] reject[s] the assertion that CPLR 301 has preserved
the provision contained in section 229-b of the Civil Practice Act limiting the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals doing business in New York to claims arising from
such business in the State.”).
73 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 612 (1990); see, e.g., Nilsa B., 445
N.Y.S.2d at 585 (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917));
ABKCO Industries, Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784 (citing Public Administrator v. Royal Bank of
Can., 224 N.E.2d 877, 878 (N.Y. 1967)).
74 See Thermoid Co. v. Fabel, 151 N.E.2d 883, 886 (N.Y. 1958); Hammett v. Hammett, 424
N.Y.S.2d 913, 915 (App. Div. 1980).
75 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
76 See id. at 204 (quoting Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
77 See, e.g., Joseph J. Kalo, The Meaning of Contact and Minimum National Contacts:
Reflections on Admiralty In Rem and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction 59 TUL. L. REV. 24, 29–30
(1984).
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with due process.78 The Court split four to four on why it was
constitutional (Justice Stevens declining to participate in that
intellectual debate), but all nine agreed that it was.79
Thus, pre-Daimler, an individual was subject to general
jurisdiction in New York by being a domiciliary, or at least a resident,
of the state, by having been served with process in the state, or, at
least in the First Department, by regularly and continuously doing
business in the state.80
The law concerning general jurisdiction over corporations was also
reasonably clear. Certainly, if a corporation was a New York
corporation, incorporated in the state, it was subject to general
jurisdiction.81 Nevertheless, even if the corporation was incorporated
elsewhere, but had become authorized to do business in New York,
registering with the New York Secretary of State—and thereby
designating that official as agent for service of process—and
becoming liable for franchise taxes, the corporation was subject to
general jurisdiction in New York.82
But even a completely foreign corporation could become subject to
general jurisdiction in New York in various ways. One, we have
described at length above—by becoming “present” in the forum by
doing business here, as Judge Cardozo wrote in Tauza, “not casually
and occasionally, but systematically and regularly.”83 General
jurisdiction could also be obtained over a foreign corporation that did
regular business in New York through an in-state agent.84 New York
Courts had established what was referred to as the “mere
solicitation” rule.85 It was not enough for general jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation that its New York-based agent merely solicited
business on the corporation’s behalf.86 But if the New York agent
performed sufficiently important services for the foreign principal
that, if it did not employ the agent, it would have to send its own
See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990).
See id.; id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
80 See In re Nilsa B.B. v. Clyde Blackwell H., 445 N.Y.S.2d 579, 587 (App. Div. 1981); ABKCO
Industries, Inc. v. Lennon, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (App. Div. 1976); e.g. Kelly S. Foss, Suing
Foreign Entities in NY: Changes to the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, HARRIS BEACH PLLC
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.harrisbeach.com/news/suing-foreign-entities-ny-changes-lawpersonal-jurisdiction/.
81 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).
82 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 304(b), 1301(a) (McKinney 2019); Flame S.A. v. Worldlink
Int’l (Holding) Ltd., 967 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (App. Div. 2013).
83 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 917 (N.Y. 1917).
84 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
85 See Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692, 694–95 (N.Y. 1982).
86 See id. Unless business solicitation was the business of the foreign corporation. See Miller
v. Surf Prop., 151 N.E.2d 874, 877 (N.Y. 1958).
78
79
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employees here, then the presence of the agent in New York was
sufficient to make the foreign corporation present here as well.87
Even if the New York agent did not do a significant amount of the
foreign corporation’s business, if the New York agent was a
subsidiary of the foreign corporation, jurisdiction might be obtained
over the foreign corporation if it treated the New York subsidiary as
a “mere department.”88 The Second Circuit, in applying New York
law, had established a four-part test that the New York State courts
had regularly applied.89 The presence of the subsidiary in New York
would constitute the presence of the parent in New York if: (1) there
was common ownership; (2) the subsidiary was financially dependent
upon the parent; (3) the parent assigned executive personnel to the
subsidiary and did not observe corporate formalities; and (4) the
parent controlled the subsidiary’s marketing and operational
policies.90
B. What Hath Daimler Wrought?
It has now been more than five years since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler. It took a significant amount of time for the New
York courts, both state and federal, to recognize the sea-change that
decision made with respect to the power of New York to exercise
general jurisdiction.91 For example, several months after Daimler,
the Appellate Division, First Department, ignoring Daimler, and still
applying its old “doing business” test for general jurisdiction over
individuals, claimed jurisdiction over a non-resident who had “longterm employment” in New York.92 That decision was cited with
approval in a Southern District decision.93 Similarly, the Second
Department, even years after Daimler, did not cite it, and, instead,
applied its old cases to hold that an individual’s business activity in
New York cannot ever be the basis of general jurisdiction.94 The same
See Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 385 F.2d 116, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1967).
See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d
Cir. 1984).
89 See id. at 120–22.
90 See id. at 120, 121, 122; Goel v. Ramachandran, 975 N.Y.S.2d 428, 434 (App. Div. 2013).
91 See Pinto-Thomaz v. Cusi, No. 15-cv-1993 (PKC), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158518, at *9,
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015); Hardware v. Ardowork Corp., 986 N.Y.S.2d 445, 446 (App. Div.
2014).
92 Hardware, 986 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
93 See Pinto-Thomaz, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158518 at *9, *10.
94 See Chen v. Guo Liang Lu, 41 N.Y.S.3d 517, 521 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Opticare
Acquisition Corp. v. Castillo, 806 N.Y.S.2d 84, 91 (App. Div. 2005)); Pichardo v. Zayas, 996
N.Y.S.2d 176, 180 (App. Div. 2014) (citing In re Nilsa B.B. v. Clyde Blackwell H., 445 N.Y.S.2d
579, 586 (App. Div. 1981)).
87
88
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slowness in recognizing the effects of Daimler was apparent in how
courts dealt with jurisdiction over corporations. Months after the
decision, the Second Department was still applying the “mere
solicitation” rule of the earlier cases.95 And a full two years after
Daimler, the Second Department was still applying the “presence”
test of Tauza.96 The federal courts, meanwhile, were sometimes
conflating the old “presence” test with the new “at home” test, and
applying a mixture of both, even some two years after the Daimler
decision.97
Eventually, however, the Courts were able to put aside what
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion in Daimler, referred to
as what “has been taught to generations of first-year law students,”
and acknowledged the change in the law brought about by Daimler.98
Thus, in Magdalena v. Lins,99 the First Department, citing Daimler,
held that New York lacked jurisdiction over an individual, although
he owned an apartment in the state, because he was not “domiciled”
in New York.100 And, eventually, the courts began applying Daimler
to corporations, as well, applying the “at home” test rather than
“presence.”101 Although one court, in applying an exceptionally
liberal definition of the “exceptional” case which the Supreme Court
said might still exist, found a corporation “at home” here because of
its ongoing New York contacts.102 But, inevitably, questions about
Daimler’s effect upon other, formerly settled areas of jurisdiction law,
began to emerge.103 Most of them remain unsettled.104

95 See Mejia-Haffner v. Killington, Ltd., 990 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (App. Div. 2014) (citing
Cardone v. Jiminy Peak, Inc., 667 N.Y.S.2d 82, 82 (App. Div. 1997)).
96 See Okeke v. Momah, 17 N.Y.S.3d 746, 748 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Sedig v. Okemo
Mountain, 612 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (App. Div. 1994)).
97 See Minnie Rose LLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)); Beem v. Noble Grp. Ltd., No. 14 Civ. 9046, 2015 WL
8781333, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2015) (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122,
135 (2d Cir. 2014); Brown v. Web.com Grp., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 3d 345, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
98 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 153 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
99 Magdalena v. Lins, 999 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. Div. 2014).
100 See id. at 45; see, e.g., IMAX Corp. v. Essel Grp., 62 N.Y.S.3d 107, 109 (App. Div. 2017).
101 See Gucci Am., Inc., v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014); Ace Decade
Holdings, Ltd. v. UBS AG, No. 653316/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4541, at *12–13 (Sup. Ct.
Dec. 7, 2016).
102 See Amtrust N. Am., Inc. v. Preferred Contractors Ins. Co. Risk Retention Grp., LLC, No.
15-cv-7505, 2016 WL 6208288, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016).
103 See Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General Personal Jurisdiction Over Transnational
Corporations for Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN. ST. L. REV. 617, 656–57 (2017).
104 See id.
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C. Is Tagging Jurisdiction Still Viable?
While generally citing the Burnham case discussed above, the
Daimler majority opinion did not discuss in any way the issue of
tagging jurisdiction. Indeed, in her “concurring” opinion, Justice
Sotomayor noted the incongruity of continuing to permit tagging
jurisdiction while otherwise limiting general jurisdiction over
individuals to the narrow ground of domicile. But, surely, an
individual served with process while passing through a state is not
“at home” there in the way Daimler defined that term—that “[f]or an
individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”105 Has tagging jurisdiction
survived Daimler? Thus far, only one lower Court decision in New
York has addressed the question, although it did not cite Burnham.
In Ford v. Bhatoe,106 the court held that, in light of Daimler, “[t]he
fact that service was effectuated in accordance with CPLR 308 on an
individual who is not domiciled in the State of New York is not
sufficient by itself to confer constitutional personal jurisdiction.”107
Certainly the language of Daimler would suggest that the Ford
decision is correct. On the other hand, would the Supreme Court
have overruled its own unanimous Burnham decision sub silentio?
The four Justices in Burnham who concluded that tagging
jurisdiction was constitutional because of its pedigree, and despite
the holding in Shaffer, distinguished the latter on the ground that
physical presence in a state was a substitute for “minimum
contacts.”108 Would a majority of the Court apply that reasoning postDaimler to continue to validate the practice? That is an issue that
will, perforce, require further development.
D. Does a Corporation’s Registration in a State Make It “at Home”
There?
As noted above, New York law was clear, pre-Daimler, that a
corporation that registered to do business here, thus naming the New
York Secretary of State as agent for service of process, became subject
to general jurisdiction in the state.109 Most, if not all, states have
similar provisions for authorizing foreign corporations to do business
105 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).
106 Ford v. Bhatoe, No. 501642/17, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4820 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2017).
107 See id. at *6–7.
108 See Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
109 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 304(a) (McKinney 2019).
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in the state.110 The penalty to a corporation which regularly does
business in New York, but does not become authorized, is an inability
to sue in a New York court.111 Whether this long-standing rule, that
becoming authorized creates general jurisdiction, has survived
Daimler, has divided the courts—both federal and state—in New
York. Some trial courts have held that Daimler has not changed the
rule, reasoning that registration constitutes a consent to
jurisdiction.112 Others have argued that Daimler has nullified that
body of law.113
The first New York appellate decision in this area was Matter of
B&M Kingstone, LLC v. Mega International Commercial Bank Co.114
There, the petitioner/judgment creditor served an information
subpoena on the New York branch of a Taiwanese bank, seeking
information from all of the bank’s branches with respect to
petitioner’s judgment debtor, in order to enforce a judgment.115
Respondent argued that, because it was not “at home” in New York,
the court lacked jurisdiction over it, and could not compel it to
produce non-New York information.116 The appellate division,
relying heavily on the Southern District decision in Vera v. Republic
of Cuba,117 held that, because respondent had registered with, and
obtained a license from, the Department of Financial Services, under
Banking Law section 200, the court had jurisdiction over it, quoting
with approval the Vera court’s holding that “[f]oreign corporations
which do business in New York are bound by the laws of both the
state of New York and the United States, and are bound by the same
judicial constraints as domestic corporations.”118
110 See Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction, 95 NEB. L. REV.
477, 508 (2016).
111 BUS. CORP. § 1312(a).
112 See In re Application of Amarnick, 558 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1977); Beach v. Citigroup
Alt. Invs. LLC, 12 Civ. 7717 (PKC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30032, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2014) (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 170, 175 (1939);
Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharms. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); Serov v.
Kerzner Int’l Resorts, Inc., No. 162184/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2818, at *11 (Sup. Ct. July
26, 2016); Bailen v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 190318/12, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3554, at *9
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014).
113 See Kyowa Seni, Co. v. ANA Aircraft Technics, Co., 80 N.Y.S.3d 866, 870 (Sup. Ct. 2018);
Mischel v. Safe Haven Enters., LLC, No. 653651/2016, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1402, at *5–6
(Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2017); Ortiz v. Great Eastern Resort Corp., N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 2016, at 50 (Sup.
Ct. Mar. 11, 2016).
114 B&M Kingstone, LLC v. Mega Int’l Commercial Bank Co., 15 N.Y.S.3d 318 (App. Div.
2015).
115 See id. at 319, 320.
116 See id. at 321.
117 Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 91 F. Supp. 3d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
118 In re B&M Kingstone, 15 N.Y.S.3d at 323 (quoting Vera, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 570).
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Since B&M, trial courts in New York have generally sought to limit
it to its particular facts—that respondent was a bank, and had, by
registering in New York, subjected itself to a complex regulatory
scheme under the Banking Law.119 By contrast, a non-bank
corporation becoming authorized pursuant to the Business
Corporation Law had no such regulations imposed upon it.120
More recently, and more directly, the Second Department has
weighed in on the issue. In Aybar v. Aybar,121 the issue was whether
Ford Motor Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in Michigan, but authorized to do business in New York,
with hundreds of dealerships and a manufacturing plant in the state,
was subject to general jurisdiction in New York.122 The Court began
its decision with a fairly broad statement:
We consider on these appeals whether, following the United
States Supreme Court decision in Daimler, a foreign
corporation may still be deemed to have consented to the
general jurisdiction of New York courts by virtue of having
registered to do business in New York and appointed a local
agent for the service of process. We conclude that it may
not.123
Later in the opinion, the court summarized its holding as follows:
We hold that in view of the evolution of in personam
jurisdiction jurisprudence, and, particularly the way in which
Daimler has altered that jurisprudential landscape, it cannot
be said that a corporation’s compliance with the existing
business registration statutes constitutes consent to the
general jurisdiction of New York courts, to be sued upon
causes of action that have no relation to New York.124
And yet, in a footnote immediately after that quoted language, the
court appears to suggest that, despite the sweeping references to

119 See, e.g., Kline v. Facebook, Inc., No. 150022/2018, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 127, at *4
(Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2019); Amelius v. Grand Imperial LLC, 64 N.Y.S.3d 855, 867 (Sup. Ct. 2017);
Aybar v. Aybar, No. 706909/2015, 2016 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2263, at *9 (Sup. Ct. May 25, 2016).
120 See, e.g., Amelius, 64 N.Y.S.3d at 867, 869.
121 Aybar v. Aybar, 93 N.Y.S.3d 159 (App. Div. 2019).
122 See id. at 161.
123 Id. at 160 (internal citation omitted).
124 Id. at 166.
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Daimler and due process, its decision might be merely based on
statutory construction.125 For, the Court noted,
The parties observe that post Daimler, some New York
lawmakers have proposed amending Business Corporation
Law § 1301 to expressly provide that a corporation’s
application to do business in New York constitutes consent to
personal jurisdiction in lawsuits in New York for all actions
against the corporation. No such changes in the law have
been effected to date, and we decline the appellants’ invitation
to opine on the constitutionality of any such possible
amendment.126
Certainly, the ultimate holding, at least of the New York courts, is
still in the future. Hopefully before the passage of lives in being plus
twenty-one years.
It should be noted that courts in other jurisdictions have passed
upon the continued viability of the rule that a foreign corporation’s
registration makes it “at home” in the state of registration.127 For
example, the Supreme Court of Delaware, interpreting its own
similar statute, concluded that Daimler had rendered its own prior
decisions, which echoed New York’s pre-Daimler cases, no longer
valid.128 The Second Circuit, interpreting Connecticut’s similar law,
concluded that it need not reach the constitutional question because
the Connecticut courts’ decisions, pre-Daimler, were inconclusive as
to whether a foreign corporation became subject to general
jurisdiction by registering there.129 But, in powerful dicta, the court
made pretty clear that, faced with a statute with no such ambiguity,
it would strike it down as inconsistent with Daimler.130 For, the
global corporations that were the Supreme Court’s concern in
Daimler become authorized to do business everywhere.131 Allowing
that authorization to create general, as opposed to long-arm,
jurisdiction wherever the corporation has become authorized,

See id. at 166 n.3.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
127 See generally Harrison, supra note 110 at 531–37 (discussing cases that have invalidated
consent by registration statutes).
128 See Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 126 (Del. 2016).
129 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 623, 634–35, 636 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing
WorldCare Ltd., Corp. v. World Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 341, 354 (D. Conn. 2011); Talenti v.
Morgan & Brother Manhattan Storage Co., 968 A.2d 933, 940 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)).
130 See Brown, 814 F.3d at 640.
131 See id.
125
126
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regardless where the cause of action arose, would, in the court’s
words, defeat Daimler through the “back-door.”132
However, an intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania has
held that, because Pennsylvania’s similar statute specifically
provides that registration there constitutes consent to general
jurisdiction, the statute does not run afoul of Daimler’s interpretation
of due process.133
At this writing, therefore, it is not certain whether a foreign
corporation becomes subject to New York general jurisdiction by
registering with the Secretary of State and becoming authorized to
do business. But the likelihood is that it does not. The one state
court
appellate
decision that
approves
jurisdiction
is
134
distinguishable.
Despite some equivocal language, another state
appellate decision holds that registration alone is insufficient.135 And
the Second Circuit has made it fairly clear that, if it were confronted
with a case involving New York law, it would hold such a reading of
the statute to be unconstitutional.136
E. Does the Presence in New York of a “Mere Department”
Subsidiary Create General Jurisdiction over the Non-New York
Parent Corporation?
As noted above, the pre-Daimler standard for determining whether
a non-New York corporation was subject to general jurisdiction
because of the “presence” in New York of a subsidiary, was set by the
oft-quoted
Second
Circuit
decision
in
Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp.137 Essentially, the question
was whether the parent treated the subsidiary—although it was
technically a separate corporation—as a “mere department.”138 If so,
then the subsidiary was, in reality, merely a branch office, and, under
Tauza, and its progeny, its “presence” in New York created
See id.
See Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 192 A.3d 1133, 1137, 1139 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2018).
134 See In re B&M Kingstone, LLC v. Mega Int’l Commercial Bank Co., 15 N.Y.S.3d 318,
322–23 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Vera v. Republic of Cuba, 91 F. Supp. 3d 561, 571 (S.D.N.Y.
2015)); Kline v. Facebook, Inc., No. 150022/2018, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 127, at *4 (Sup. Ct.
Jan. 10, 2019) (citing In re B&M Kingstone, LLC, 15 N.Y.S.3d at 322–23).
135 See Aybar v. Aybar, 93 N.Y.S.3d 159, 160, 166 n.3 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014)); supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
136 See Brown, 814 F.3d at 640; supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
137 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 751 F.2d 117, 120, 121, 122
(2d Cir. 1984) (citing Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895, 897, 898 (N.Y. 1972));
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
138 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 751 F.2d at 120.
132
133
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jurisdiction over the non-New York parent.139
But, since Daimler specifically rejected Tauza’s continued viability,
does the Volkswagenwerk analysis still apply? Again, the courts in
New York, both state and federal, have been split.
Initially, in two New York Supreme Court cases, the courts
suggested that, post-Daimler, the “mere department” rule was
abrogated,140 while Southern District cases held that the rule was not
abrogated.141
More recently, New York courts have apparently assumed, without
deciding, that the Volkswagenwerk analysis still applies, in holding
that jurisdiction was lacking because the standards under
Volkswagenwerk had not been met.142
In sum, this issue is still largely unresolved. The decisions that
appear to have fully appreciated the impact of Daimler on parentsubsidiary jurisdiction143 have held that, under Daimler, the “mere
department” analysis will create general jurisdiction over a non-New
York parent corporation only if the activities of the New York
subsidiary create the “exceptional” case that makes the parent “at
home” in New York, or create jurisdiction over a non-New York
subsidiary only if the parent is “at home” in New York.144

139 Laufer v. Ostrow, 434 N.E.2d 692, 696 (N.Y. 1982) (citing Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447
(1952); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
140 See Smart Trike, MNF, PTE, Ltd. v. Piermont Prods. LLC, No. 650376/2012, 2014 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2294, at *7–8 n.3 (Sup. Ct. May 16, 2014) (citing Deutsche ZentralGenossenschaftsbank AG v. UBS AG, No. 652575/2012, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1858, at *12
(Sup. Ct. Apr. 17, 2014)); Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, slip op. at 8 (citing
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 141).
141 See Paysys Int’l, Inc. v. Atos SE, No. 14 Civ. 10105 (SAS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97460,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015), vacated on other grounds, 901 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2018); Nykcool
A.B. v. Pac. Int’l Servs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Newlead Holdings Ltd.
v. Ironridge Glob. IV Ltd., No. 14cv3945, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80563, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June
11, 2014) (quoting Dorfman v. Marriott Int’l Hotels, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10496 (CSH), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 72, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2002)).
142 See Wolberg v. IAI N. Am., Inc., 77 N.Y.S.3d 348, 350 (App. Div. 2018) (citing
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 751 F.2d at 120, 121, 122); FIA Leveraged Fund Ltd. v.
Grant Thornton LLP, 56 N.Y.S.3d 12, 16 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 751 F.2d at 120, 121, 122).
143 See SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG, 114 F. Supp. 3d 161, 167–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 121, 123, 139); In re M/V MSC Flaminia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 313, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
144 See SPV OSUS Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 3d at 168, 169 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19;
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 751 F.2d at 120); In re M/V MSC Flaminia, 107 F. Supp.
3d at 320–21.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Five years after the Supreme Court changed all the rules
respecting general jurisdiction, the courts in New York continue to
wrestle with the fallout.145 The limitations the Court announced in
Daimler appear simple on the surface—that in almost every case an
individual will only be subject to general jurisdiction where that
individual is domiciled, and a corporation will only be subject to
general jurisdiction where it is incorporated, or has its principal place
of business.146 But application of this new rule to previously wellsettled New York jurisdiction law has proven not simple at all.
Thus far, New York appellate authority on any of these open issues
has been slim. Presumably, at some point, the Court of Appeals will
weigh in, and authoritatively resolve them. Until then, the lower
courts, and practitioners, will have to continue to keep looking for the
comforts of home.

145 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); Aybar v. Aybar,
93 N.Y.S.3d 159, 160, 166 n.3 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. 117); supra notes 133–
36 and accompanying text.
146 See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).

